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Cow Protection, Hindu Identity and the Politics of Hurt in India, c.1890–2019 
 
Shabnum Tejani 
 
Recent violence in India towards minority Muslim and Dalit communities in response to their alleged 
killing of cows is shocking in its brutality. Those responsible maintain the cow is sacred to Hindus and 
a threat to its life is an attack on Hinduism itself. They claim a deep sense of hurt at what they see to be 
the historic violation of their religion.  In contrast, liberal commentators argue that right-wing forces 
have become emboldened since Hindu nationalists came to power in 2014. Yet, Hindu nationalism 
alone cannot explain the widespread belief that people whose livelihoods depend on cattle are beyond 
the democratic norms of tolerance. Rather, we must consider ‘affect’ and the role of history to 
understand the currency of cow protection in the cultural politics of hurt in contemporary India.  
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On 28 September 2015, in a small hamlet near Dadri in the north Indian state of Uttar 
Pradesh, one of the neighbours of Mohammad Akhlaq accused him of stealing and 
slaughtering his calf, which had gone missing. It was at the time of Eid ul-Fitr, when 
Muslims customarily slaughter an animal to feed the poor and their family and neighbours. 
As people gathered outside the house, two young men pressed the priest of the local temple to 
announce on the loudspeaker that the family of Mohammad Akhlaq had killed a cow and 
consumed its meat. Later that night a crowd came with sticks, woke the family, and accused 
them of eating beef. They found meat in the refrigerator. The family claimed it was mutton. 
But they were all dragged outside: Akhlaq and his son were beaten with sticks and bricks and 
stabbed. The police came an hour later, by which time Akhlaq was dead and his son seriously 
wounded. The police sent the meat to two different laboratories to be tested; both concluded 
 
 
that it was mutton. Yet in July 2016, residents of the village filed a petition with a local 
magistrate against Mohammad Akhlaq for the offence of cow slaughter. They had gone to a 
separate laboratory and, on the basis of that report which found the meat was from ‘a cow or 
its progeny’, claimed that he had indeed slaughtered a cow. It is unlikely that the meat tested 
was from the day of the attack and there were strong suspicions that a sample had been 
brought in to substitute the original. Despite this, fourteen of the eighteen accused in the 
murder have been granted bail, with one of the accused running for election to parliament. In 
contrast, six of Akhlaq’s family were charged under the 1955 U.P. Prevention of Cow 
Slaughter Act.1 
                                                          
1 The ‘Dadri Mob Lynching’ has been widely reported: ‘Why India Man Was Lynched over Beef Rumours,’ 
BBC News, 1 October 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-34409354; ‘In Dadri a Year Later, 
Sadness and Anger but No Justice,’ The Wire, 28 September 2016, https://thewire.in/communalism/mohammad-
akhlaq-dadri-bisara-village; Abhimanyu Kumar, ‘The Lynching that Changed India,’ Al-Jazeera, 5 October 
2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/09/lynching-changed-india-170927084018325.html; 
Betwa Sharma, ‘Three Years after Dadri the Man Accused of Lynching Mohammad Akhlaq Is Free and 
Running for Lok Sabha,’ The Huffington Post, 28 September 2018, 
https://www.huffingtonpost.in/2018/09/26/three-years-on-accused-in-mohammad-akhlaqs-lynching-is-free-and-
ready-to-fight-the-lok-sabha-election_a_23542377/; ‘After 43 Court Hearings Akhlaq’s Family Banks on 
Supreme Court Order for Justice,’ Economic Times (India), 23 August 2018, 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/after-43-court-hearings-akhlaqs-family-banks-
on-supreme-court-order-for-justice/articleshow/65509607.cms. See also the Human Rights Watch report 2019, 
‘Violent Cow Protection in India: Vigilante Groups Attack Minorities,’ 18 February 2019, 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/02/18/violent-cow-protection-india/vigilante-groups-attack-minorities. 
 
 
In July 2016, four Dalit leather tanners were skinning cows in a village near Una in 
the western Indian state of Gujarat.2 They were approached by men belonging to the Shiv 
Sena, an aggressive organisation originating in Bombay aligned with the Sangh Parivar, the 
‘family’ of Hindu nationalist organisations, who accused them of having slaughtered the 
cows. The men insisted the animals were already dead when they acquired them. Dalits 
traditionally do the work of clearing away the carcasses of animals, the touch of which upper-
caste Hindus deem polluting. They skin them, remove the flesh and bones, and sell the tallow 
and cartilage. Nevertheless, the four were stripped and beaten with iron rods, then tied up and 
driven back to their village, where they were beaten again in public. A video of the beatings 
was widely shared on social media. In March 2017, the Gujarat government passed a new law 
making cow slaughter punishable with life imprisonment, overturning the previous four-to-
seven year sentence.3 
                                                          
2 ‘Dalit’ is a Marathi and Hindi term meaning ‘the oppressed’ and refers to people of the lowest social strata in 
Indian society. It is a self-designated term that rejects the colonial ‘untouchable’ and Gandhi’s patronising 
‘harijan’ (children of god).  
3 ‘4 Dalits Stripped, Beaten Up for Skinning Dead Cow,’ Times of India, 13 July 2016, 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/rajkot/4-Dalits-stripped-beaten-up-for-skinning-dead-
cow/articleshow/53184266.cms. On the ‘carcass dumping’ protest led by Dalits afterwards, see Aarefa Johari, 
‘An Assault on Dalits May Have Triggered the Biggest Lower Caste Uprising in Gujarat in 30 Years’, Scroll, 20 
July 2016, https://scroll.in/article/812100/an-assault-on-dalits-may-have-triggered-the-biggest-lower-caste-
uprising-in-gujarat-in-30-years. On the new sentencing laws, see Michael Safi, ‘Cow Slaughter to Be Punishable 
by Life Sentence,’ The Guardian, 14 March 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/14/indian-
state-government-life-sentence-cow-slaughter.  
 
 
The recent violence in India towards Muslims and Dalits by upper-caste Hindus in 
response to their alleged killing of cows has been shocking in its brutality.4 Cow protection 
activists, or gaurakshakhs, maintain that they are doing their duty to defend their religion, 
arguing that cow slaughter represents an attack on Hinduism. Their acts of violence reflect 
their anger and hurt, the deep sense of injury they claim to feel when a cow’s life is 
threatened.5 Alongside these vigilante groups exists a range of societies for cow protection 
which seek to provide refuge for cows that would otherwise have been killed.6 For such 
societies, cow protection is an auspicious act. The cow represents life – it gives milk for 
personal strength, provides labour for agriculture and manure to fertilise the land. Its urine is 
said to confer untold health benefits: it cleans the liver, prevents cancer, cures migraines and 
combats a range of other diseases. Fundamentally, the cow represents peace and prosperity, 
spiritual and material. She is a sacred being and Hindus consider her as a mother – Gau 
Mata.7 The killing of cows, these societies maintain, thus offends the deepest-held 
                                                          
4 IndiaSpend, a data journalism website, recorded sixty-six reported cow-related attacks in India between 2010 
and 2017, during which twenty-six people were killed, twenty-two of whom were Muslim, and at least two 
hundred were injured. See http://archive.indiaspend.com.  
5 See a documentary on the Bhartiya Gauraksha Dal, a federation of cow protection organisations: ‘Cow 
Protection is Our Life’s Mission, Says Bharatiya Gau Raksha Dal Member,’ CNN News-18, 6 June 2017, 
https://www.news18.com/videos/india/cow-protection-is-our-lifes-mission-says-bharatiya-gau-raksha-dal-
member-1424399.html. Also see Ashwaq Masoodi, ‘Who Is a Gau Rakshak?,’ Livemint, 26 July 2016, 
https://www.livemint.com/Politics/Mi6HZpayTzwJT7G6zy8dTO/Who-is-a-Gau-Rakshak.html. 
6 I examine the history of these societies later in the paper. 
7 It is unclear when exactly the cow comes to be referred to as ‘mother.’ Cows appear in numerous Hindu texts 
from the puranic and epic myths onwards and refer to the benefits of the cow but do not describe the animal as 
mother to humans or Hindus. I suspect this is a more recent designation from the nineteenth century developed 
by Hindu reformist organisations building on the existing sanctity of the cow. See D. N. Jha, The Myth of the 
Holy Cow (New Delhi: Navayana, [2001] 2009).  
 
 
sensibilities of Hindus.8 In contrast, some social commentators have argued that the violence 
around cow protection, far from being simply a matter of religious offence, is a manifestation 
of more pernicious forces. Since Narendra Modi led the Bharatiya Janata Party, the electoral 
arm of the Sangh Parivar in India, to victory in the 2014 national elections, right-wing forces 
have become emboldened to carry out all manner of atrocities against religious and caste 
minorities.9 Liberal academics and news media outlets criticise Modi, a life-long member of 
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a paramilitary Hindu nationalist organisation, for 
his lukewarm condemnation of the violence. The violence of the gaurakshaks, he has implied, 
is understandable, as cow slaughter ‘is an emotive issue’.10 
However, adherence to Hindutva ideology cannot alone explain the recent violence 
around cow protection.11 Most ordinary citizens would not identify with Hindutva’s core 
ideological tenets nor condone such violence. Yet a broad consensus has emerged around 
cow protection in the cultural politics of India’s twenty-first century. The eating of beef and 
the trade in cattle has become commonly accepted as so deeply offensive to Hindus that those 
who engage in these activities now find themselves increasingly outside the democratic 
                                                          
8 See the site for the International Society for Cow Protection: http://iscowp.org/.  
9 ‘Modi’s India: The High Cost of Protecting Holy Cows,’ Financial Times, 22 November 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/63522f50-caf3-11e7-ab18-7a9fb7d6163e; Aftab Alam, ‘Holy Cow: As Hindu 
Nationalism Surges in India, Cows Are Protected but Minorities Not So Much,’ The Conversation, 28 April 
2017, http://theconversation.com/holy-cow-as-hindu-nationalism-surges-in-india-cows-are-protected-but-
minorities-not-so-much-76632. 
10 ‘Cow Is Mother but No One Should Take Law in Their Hand: PM Modi,’ Indian Express, 16 July 2017, 
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/cow-is-mother-but-no-one-should-take-law-in-their-hand-pm-narendra-
modi-4753358/.  
11 Hindutva is a term that indicates ‘Hindu-ness,’ incorporating ideas about land, blood and civilisation. See 
Chetan Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies and Modern Myths (Oxford: Berg, 2001). 
 
 
norms of tolerance and the legal protection of the state. A High Court judge from Hyderabad 
recently dismissed the plea of a cattle trader from whom sixty-three cows and two bulls were 
seized illegally by gaurakshakhs ruling that the cow was ‘sacred national wealth’ which is 
‘substitute to Mother and God’.12 In a startling parallel, videos of slaughtered cows and 
murders of Muslims and Dalits circulate on social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook 
and WhatsApp, feeding a voyeurism and reinforcing prejudices about minority communities.  
How can one explain such institutional failures and such failures of social conscience? 
To answer this question, this paper suggests, first, that one has to consider the importance of 
‘affect’ in the study of cow protection violence in India and so-called ‘religious’ violence 
more broadly. ‘Emotions’ provide powerful legitimation to individual and collective 
behaviour because they appeal to something apparently non-rational: deeply felt, instinctive 
and, by extension, universal. Thus, while not condoning theft or grievous bodily harm, many 
sympathise with someone gripped by an uncontrollable emotion – anger, fear, hurt – when his 
or her deepest held ideals are felt to be threatened. Second, I argue that the contemporary 
politics of religious offence in India must be understood as part of a longer historical 
trajectory, shaped by the relationship between the colonial state and religious communities. In 
its transition to crown rule in 1858 and for some time before, the colonial state in India had 
pledged to uphold longstanding customs of its subjects, regardless of ‘religious faith or 
observances’. It promised ‘non-interference’ in these customs and the protection of religious 
                                                          
12 ‘Cow Substitute to Mother and God, Says Hyderabad HC Judge,’ Times of India, 10 June 2017, 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/cow-substitute-to-mother-and-god-says-hyderabad-hc-
judge/articleshow/59076939.cms.  
 
 
feelings. The colonial state was thus central to creating a platform for articulating religious 
offence and enabling what I will call a ‘politics of hurt’.13  
Conflicts around cow protection movements occurred in India first in the 1890s. They 
took place in towns and cities, largely in British India. Woven through public lectures, 
posters, boycotts and open violence were narratives of hurt, loss and anger at the perceived 
humiliation of the historic decline of Hindus and their subjection by foreigners. The colonial 
state’s promise to protect the religious feelings of communities framed and contained such 
conflicts.14 In turn, those who claimed their customs had been violated asserted their ‘hurt 
feelings’ as proof. Strikingly, the movements, and the accompanying violence, retained a 
similar form and content through the twentieth century and into the contemporary moment. 
How do we explain the fact that across changing political, historical and regional contexts, 
they looked and sounded very much ‘the same’? Cow protection activists appeal to a certain 
primordialism, claiming their hurt today is as it has always been. Common sense 
understandings and media reportage have bolstered the idea that the ‘recurrent’ nature of 
                                                          
13 Scholarship across disciplines has turned to considering emotion in social processes. See, for instance, Brian 
Massumi, ‘The Autonomy of Affect,’ Cultural Critique 31 (1995): 83–109, Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics 
of Emotion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004); and Martha Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why 
Love Matters for Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). There is a growing literature 
considering emotion in the Indian context. See Veronique Benei, Schooling Passions: Nation, History and 
Language in Contemporary Western India (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); and Margrit Pernau et 
al., Civilizing Emotions: Concepts in Nineteenth-Century Asia and Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2015). On hurt, anger and offence, see Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of 
Globalization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), chap. 7: ‘Life after Primordialism’; and Rina 
Ramdev, Sandhya Devesan Nambiar, and Debaditya Bhattacharya, eds, Sentiments, Politics and Censorship: 
The State of Hurt (Delhi: Sage Publications, 2015).  
14 This was through section 153A of the Indian Penal Code and section 295A, which was introduced after 1927. 
 
 
ethnic and religious violence speaks to the enduring nature of these identities. However, life 
in twenty-first century Uttar Pradesh is radically transformed from that in the 1890s. What 
gives cow protection its currency in a globalised, neo-liberal, media-savvy world? This paper 
suggests that it is the emotive appeal, one that is both deeply personal and experienced 
collectively – thus, both psychic and social – that knits very different contexts together and 
ties them to the ‘meta-politics’ of Hindu nationalism.  
The paper begins by addressing the historiography of cow protection and outlines 
some methodological considerations in writing histories of emotion. It then examines cow 
protection movements from the late nineteenth century and looks at two points in the early 
twentieth century when they were mobilised anew. The final section addresses the question of 
‘offence’ and the politics of identity in multicultural societies. It considers the way that a 
liberal political framework that seeks to protect communities reifies these identities, reducing 
them to something personal or cultural, emptying them of political possibility. Yet, the 
historical relationship between politics and emotion has been crucial to shaping the contours 
of religious violence, something that has hitherto been little explored in the context of India.15 
This paper suggests that it is through disembedding identity from history that cow protection 
movements would seem to ‘replicate’ across time and space. Moreover, the state’s promise to 
                                                          
15 There is a substantial literature on the relationship between religious violence, politics and emotion, 
particularly since the ‘war on terror.’ It has largely focused on the contemporary period, from the fields of 
anthropology and politics rather than history. See, for instance, Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007); and Martha Nussbaum, The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the 
Politics of Fear in an Anxious Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). On South Asia, see 
articles collected in Samaj 2 (2008), an issue titled ‘Outraged Communities’; and Asad Ali Ahmed, ‘Specters of 
Macaulay: Blasphemy, the Indian Penal Code and Pakistan’s Postcolonial Predicament,’ in Censorship in South 
Asia: Cultural Regulation from Sedition to Seduction, ed. Raminder Kaur and William Mazarella (Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 2009), 172–205. 
 
 
uphold religious freedom and protect communities’ ‘feelings’ paradoxically facilitates the 
conditions for violence.  
 
Writing histories of emotion 
There is an extensive literature on the history of cow protection in India. This has largely 
focused on its part in a story of communalism, the peculiarly South Asian term that refers to 
conflict between religious communities, particularly Hindus and Muslims, first used in the 
early twentieth century.16 In the late colonial period, ‘communalism’ was a pejorative term 
used by nationalists and colonial officials alike, signifying atavistic passions that were prone 
to violence. Historians have understood communalism as the result of politicised religious 
identities forged by colonial knowledge and religious reform through the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. However, they have tended to focus on communalism’s more obviously 
political aspects – the institutional and ideological dimensions of religious identity – rather 
than emotion.17 
                                                          
16 See Anand Yang, ‘Sacred Symbol and Sacred Space in Rural India: Community Mobilization in the “Anti-
Cow Killing” Riot of 1893,’ Comparative Studies in Society and History (CSSH) 22, no. 4 (1980): 576–96; 
Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Rallying Around the Cow: Sectarian Strife in the Bhojpuri Region, c.1888–1917,’ in 
Subaltern Studies II, ed. Ranajit Guha (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), 60–129; C. S. Adcock, 
‘Sacred Cows and Secular History: Cow Protection Debates in Colonial North India,’ Comparative Studies of 
South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 30, no. 2 (2010): 297–311.  
17 Peter van der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1998); Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885–1930 (New Delhi: Manohar, 
1991); Sandria Freitag, Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism 
in North India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Modern India 
(New Delhi: Vikas, 1987). Freitag, in her formulation of ‘public arenas,’ hints at the possibilities of affective 
association.  
 
 
How might one use existing documentary evidence, much of it from colonial sources, 
to write emotion into the histories of cow protection? Historians are relative newcomers to 
emotion, notes Joanna Bourke in Fear: A Cultural History.18 This is, in part, because the 
traditional archive does not immediately lend itself to the study of phenomena that are 
commonly deemed intimate and unknowable. The study of emotion was, until recently, 
confined to the fields of psychology and philosophy. Scholars maintained the view that 
emotions had a biological basis: experienced through the sensory nervous system, like 
colours, and ‘hardwired’ into individuals.19 They produce involuntary changes in the body 
which, the historian William Reddy notes, have been understood to be ‘unconscious’ 
cognitive processes that ‘steal upon us when we least expect it’.20 Anthropologists and 
historians have challenged this psychobiological orthodoxy. Janet Abu-Lughod and Catherine 
Lutz argued that the location of emotions ‘inside’ a person and their treatment as universal 
assumed the most reliable way to study them was through personal, ‘introspective’ accounts. 
Rather, they maintained, emotions are cultural phenomena, embedded in, and created by, 
social relationships and social discourse.21 Similarly, Bourke notes that there is nothing 
natural or immutable about the way emotions are experienced. There is no inner response to 
fear that is not shared by other emotions. Moreover, what people feared shifted over time, as 
                                                          
18 Joanna Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History (London: Virago, 2005). 
19 William Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 3. 
20 Reddy, Navigation of Feeling, 13–15.  
21 Janet Abu-Lughod and Catherine Lutz, ‘Introduction: Discourse, Emotion and the Politics of Everyday Life,’ 
in Language and the Politics of Emotion, ed. Abu-Lughod and Lutz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 1–24. 
 
 
did the experience and very meaning of that emotion. Emotional responses are, she maintains, 
‘constructed discursively by particular interpretive communities’.22  
The idea that emotions have ‘social lives’ and, by implication, historical lives, is one 
that the philosopher Robert Solomon develops and informs my approach here.23 Solomon 
argues against the interiorising of emotion, emphasising as it does a Cartesian separation of 
public and private worlds. Instead, he sees emotions as ‘primarily situated in human 
relationships’. They are ‘purposive’, that is, they have an intent and are ‘in themselves 
strategic and political’.24 Solomon argues that the idea that one is ‘struck by’ passion or 
overcome with anger is misleading, for ‘emotions do not just happen to us’ but ‘can be said to 
be rational’. They have ends and ‘seek their own satisfaction’ – anger seeks vengeance, love 
seeks possession, and so on. Emotions thus take place ‘in the world, not in the mind, the 
psyche or the soul’. As such, actions or ‘behaviour’ are key to understanding them. Emotions, 
Solomon writes, are ‘intimately tied to behaviour’; indeed, the act of the emotion is the 
emotion: ‘the emotion and its expression are one thing and not two’.25  
Understanding emotions as political and strategic in nature provides a useful avenue 
into thinking about religious and ethnic violence generally, and the potency of Indian cow 
protection movements specifically. Scholars have understood communalism as localised 
responses to a specific threat on the one hand, or the result of broad cultural and political 
change on the other. However, the former approach understands communal violence as 
                                                          
22 Bourke, Fear, 73–76. 
23 Robert Solomon, ‘The Politics of Emotion,’ in Bringing the Passions Back In: The Emotions in Political 
Philosophy, ed. Rebecca Kingston and Leonard Ferry (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008), 
189–208. 
24 Solomon, ‘Politics of Emotion,’ 192–93, emphasis in original. 
25 Solomon, ‘Politics of Emotion,’ 193–96. 
 
 
having rational, often economic, motivations, and the latter tends towards seeing these 
conflicts as teleological in nature.26 It has proved analytically difficult to connect local, 
everyday incidents with what Veena Das calls a ‘master symbol’ – broad cultural and 
ideological narratives – through which these conflicts are viewed.27 Arjun Appadurai 
suggests that a way to understand the interface between localised violence and broader 
cultural meanings is through a ‘politics of affect’.28 ‘Macroevents’, he writes, ‘work their 
way into highly localised structures of feeling by being drawn into the discourse and 
narratives of the locality’. At the same time, ‘the local narratives … in terms of which 
ordinary life and its conflicts are read … become shot through with a subtext of interpretive 
possibilities that is the direct product of the workings of the local imaginings of broader 
regional, national and global events’. Once an ‘anthology of images’ is created, there will be 
‘fresh episodes of … interpretation and suffering’ which can work their way into new 
structures of feeling.29 Sara Ahmed similarly argues that emotions circulate through society, 
almost like currency, in a way that binds individuals and social objects to broader collective 
ideas. These ‘affective economies’ produce meanings from the specific relationship between 
the objects to which emotions attach.30  
Appadurai and Ahmed are concerned with the contemporary globalised world. Yet 
their insights can be brought to bear on how we might explain the potency of cow protection 
movements historically across different contexts without falling into either the materialist or 
                                                          
26 Chandra, Communalism; Freitag, Collective Action.  
27 Veena Das, ed., Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), 14. 
28 Appadurai, Modernity, 144.  
29 Appadurai, Modernity, 153.  
30 Sara Ahmed, ‘Affective Economies,’ Social Text 79, no. 2 (2004): 117–39. 
 
 
teleological frames. I suggest that emotions signify, contain and mobilise social and political 
discourses to purposeful ends. These discourses can be understood through legal structures, 
individual declamation, political language and public acts, all of which enable conventional 
documentary sources to tell a different kind of story than we have hitherto heard about the 
histories of communal violence and communal identities in India.  
 
Cow protection  
Cow protection movements in India began in the 1880s and were associated with a Hindu 
reform association, the Arya Samaj. It was founded in Punjab, in the northwest of the 
subcontinent, by a Gujarati Brahmin, Swami Dayanand Saraswati, who had, since the 1870s, 
been preaching a radically reformed Hinduism.31 Like many nineteenth-century reformers, 
Dayanand maintained that Hindus and Hinduism had undergone a long decline. Over 
thousands of years, through the wars of the Mahabharata and invasions by foreigners – Huns, 
Turks, Bactrians, Scythians and then Muslims and Christians – Hindus had become 
spiritually weakened. Consequently, they had fallen, politically and economically, and were 
now subject to foreign (British) rule. The practices of Hinduism had, Dayanand maintained, 
become corrupted over time. False practices – caste hierarchy, pilgrimage, horoscopes, child 
marriage and temple devotion – had grown around Hinduism as barnacles attach themselves 
to a sunken vessel. This story of internal weakness and fragmentation, as well as external 
aggression and conversion, was central to a sense of shared historical pain. In place of the 
accepted rites, the reformed Arya religion created new rituals including shuddhi, the 
‘purification’ or reconversion ceremony that sought to ‘return’ Muslims and Christians to the 
                                                          
31 See Kenneth Jones, Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19th-Century Punjab (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1976); C. S. Adcock, The Limits of Tolerance: Indian Secularism and the Politics of Religious 
Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).  
 
 
Hindu fold, and cow protection. The Muslims and Christians who had conquered India were 
beef eaters, Dayanand pointed out. The wanton slaughter of cows had resulted in their 
declining population, creating a scarcity of milk – important in a society of vegetarians – and 
widespread malnutrition. If India was to rise again in the scale of nations, he preached, she 
needed to regain her strength, both physical and spiritual. For this, cow protection was key.32 
Colonial officials had monitored cow protection societies in different parts of India 
since they first came to their attention.33 The activities of the societies included petitioning 
officials to protect cattle, taking processions of cows through the streets and holding public 
meetings. The president of the Society for the Preservation of Horned Cattle in Bombay 
claimed the society’s concern, ‘in an essentially agricultural country like India’, was ‘to 
acquaint people … with the difficulties attendant on the diminution of cattle’.34 Societies 
organised lectures in different regions to raise subscriptions for the movement.35 Sriman 
Swami, an itinerant Hindu sage from Allahabad in northern India, established societies 
wherever he went and collected money for a ‘Cow Memorial Fund’.36 In 1889, he spoke at 
meetings where he complained that the country was ‘being reduced to poverty by the drain of 
wealth to England’. Moreover, he said, ‘“John Bull’s” excessive appetite for beef’ had 
brought ‘ruin to the agriculturalist and to the natives in … general’.37 Cow protection 
advocates maintained that the large number of cattle being slaughtered meant that there was 
                                                          
32 Jones, Arya Dharm, 168–69. 
33 ‘Note on the Agitation Against Cow Killing,’ British Library (BL), India Office Records (IOR), R/2/28/257.  
34 Dinshaw Petit to Secretary of the Judicial Department, Government of Bombay, 26 May 1894, BL, IOR, 
L/PJ/6/379 File 1460.  
35 ‘Note,’ 10. 
36 ‘Note,’ 4.  
37 Memoranda about Sriman Swami, Secretary of ‘Cow Memorial Fund’ Society, Allahabad, 1890, BL, IOR, 
L/PJ/6/269 File 149. 
 
 
not sufficient milk and ghee (clarified butter) and Hindus had become physically weak. Cow 
dung was scarce and crops were not what they once were for want of manure.38 The president 
of the Gaorakshini Sabha in Poona, Maharashtra, noted that the ‘promiscuous slaughter of the 
cow’ meant that prices of crops had risen, ‘the nation is underfed and the health of the people 
is greatly affected’.39 Everywhere, speakers urged people to stop cows from going to 
slaughter. Hindus were told they ‘should offer a rupee extra and thereby prevent its falling 
into the hands of the butcher’.40  
However, while societies emphasised their work was ‘purely philanthropical and in no 
way political’, their rules explicitly prohibited Hindus from selling cows to Muslims and 
untouchables.41 Their activities therefore had a clear and detrimental impact on occupations 
dominated by these communities: 
 
Rule 6: Nats, Banjaras, Chamars [untouchable castes] and others buy cows and sell 
them to butchers; and Musulmans and others are the very cause of the slaughter of 
cows. Cows shall not be sold into the hands of any such persons and if any kind of 
cow die the owner shall sell its skin to a proper person and apply the money to cow 
protection. … 
Rule 20: As a Chamar is a cow-killer it is most reprehensible that he should be 
employed to attend cows, or that cows … shall be left to his mercy: … therefore no 
Chamar shall … be employed as a cowherd.42 
                                                          
38 Satara, 16 August 1893, Secret Abstracts of Police Intelligence (SAPI), CID Office, Mumbai. 
39 Poona, 28 September 1893, SAPI. 
40 Satara, 16 August 1893, SAPI. 
41 Dharwar, 16 October 1893, SAPI. 
42 ‘Note on the Cow Protection Agitation in the Gorakhpur District,’ BL, IOR, L/PJ/6/365 File 84 1894. 
 
 
 
Moreover, there were numerous reports of hostility. Patras, or anonymous leaflets, circulated 
across regions, forbidding Hindus from selling cows to butchers and encouraging them to 
shun Muslims altogether.43 At the Behrampur cattle fair in Bengal, where in 1888 butchers 
complained they could not obtain cattle on account of the cow protection movement, in 1891 
there was violence when ‘a crowd of Hindus armed with lathis (quarter staves often shod 
with iron) attacked the butchers taking cattle for the commissariat at Dinapore’, driving off 
150 head of cattle.44  
The activities of the cow protection societies had become more openly intimidating by 
1893, prompting serious riots in Bombay in the west, Rangoon in the east and Azamgarh in 
the north. Cow protection activists threatened anyone who sold cattle. In June 1893, an 
official report from Ghazipur, in northern India, noted that before Bakri-Id, a Muslim 
landlord had sent a number of cows to a neighbouring town to be sacrificed, accompanied by 
a Muslim butcher and a Chamar leather worker. On the way, they were attacked by three or 
four hundred Hindus armed with lathis, shouting ‘Gao gohar!’ (Save the cow!). The cattle 
were taken to a cow protection society and, the report continued, if a local Hindu landlord 
had not warned the crowd to stop, the Muslims would have been killed. Elsewhere, not far 
from Ghazipur, on the morning of Id, a crowd of seven hundred Hindus armed with lathis 
converged on the village of Khatripur shouting ‘Mahabir ki jai!’ and ‘Gao gohar!’ They 
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proceeded to Muslim residences and threatened them with all kinds of violence ‘unless they 
promised never again to sacrifice cows’.45  
Such punishment was also meted out to Hindus who sold cows for slaughter. The case 
of the farmer Rachhman Paure was one of many. He had sold a bullock to a local butcher. 
Some days later three men came to question him as to why he had sold the animal to a 
Muslim. They threatened to cut off his water source and break his pots. Others said he should 
be prevented from working. Paure’s testimony continued: ‘they pulled down the tiles of my 
roof and smashed my earthen vessels. [They] then went and stopped the irrigation of my 
sugarcane field’. One of the men prevented sweetmeats for his daughter’s marriage from 
being delivered to her father-in-law’s home. Paure was told in no uncertain terms that ‘if I did 
not get the bullock back they would loot my house and kill me’.46 The aggression of 
gaurakshaks, their rules of conduct and public processions, sought to discipline the behaviour 
of those who traded in cows, live and dead, and create a climate of fear among them.  
Moreover, pamphlets, poems and posters distributed by cow protection societies 
reflected a particular understanding of Muslims as marauders and defilers of Hindu values. 
One poster showed a cow with a calf at its udder, the god Krishna above with a sign 
‘Dharmaraj’ (kingdom of righteousness), a woman at its side holding a bowl labelled ‘Hindu’ 
and a Muslim man with a sword ready to slay the innocent cow, labelled ‘Kaliyug’ (age of 
darkness).47 The cartoon depicted in a snapshot the condition of India. In an age of truth 
(‘Satyug’), people would wait for the calf to feed before taking milk from the cow. But this 
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was a time of broken morals where men slaughtered cows. The cow fed humans with milk, as 
she feeds her own calf, and should thus be regarded as the universal mother, or Gau-mata. To 
kill a cow was like killing one’s own mother, but more so as all the gods dwell in the cow. To 
kill a cow was to attack every Hindu.48 Poems also appealed to Hindus to take courage and 
fight to save cows from slaughter: ‘Rush amongst the waves of the battle field … [and] rout 
… the stupid Mlenchas’ who ‘kill the best of animals, while you Arya brothers are sitting … 
What, are you wearing bodices (i.e. are you women)? ... For once, rise, oh, why do you 
fear?’49 The circulating posters and pamphlets, the public lectures and aggressive crowds 
preventing butchers from buying cattle, fed a discourse imbued with emotive qualities: pride 
in the community’s righteous past, hurt at the decline of that civilisation at the hands of 
outsiders, anger at the attack on the Hindu religion. Central to this emotive landscape was a 
profound sense of moral injury – the sense of psychic hurt intertwined with the physical 
injury to the cow. 
The wave of cow protection riots in 1893 generated a powerful response from Muslim 
imams and others who appealed to their co-religionists to mobilise against what they saw as 
their persecution by Hindus. A pamphlet circulating in Muslim neighbourhoods of small-
town western India stated that Muslims were being ‘forbidden at the point of the sword from 
observing their religious duties’: ‘Hindus have … become enemies of our life and property … 
Muhammadans are … forced to [watch] while our honour and religion are levelled to the 
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dust’.50 Pamphlets warned of the interference in the freedom to practise Islam. Hindus, they 
said, ‘wanted to stop the cow from being slaughtered at all’, which wounded the ‘religious … 
sensibilities of Muslims’.51 Articles blamed the colonial government for not remaining 
neutral in their dealings with religious communities, for violating the promise of non-
interference. The government had departed from this position and ‘taken a side, pandering to 
the cry of Hindus against the exercise of their religious rites by the Musalmans’.52  
The riots prompted officials to reflect on how to balance the competing claims of 
Hindu and Muslim communities, each insisting their right to practise longstanding customs 
had been violated. As one letter from the Home Department noted in 1893, ‘impartiality’ was 
the ‘guiding principle’ of the administration; it ‘does not permit one party to impose its will 
upon another’. But reconciling ‘the impartial administration of justice and the equal treatment 
of all creeds’ with ‘repressing demonstrations intended or likely to give offence to religious 
opponents’ was a complex task as there was a ‘tendency towards assertion of religious 
privileges on both sides since the country passed under the British Government’.53 The 
administration had promised to uphold the custom of all religions equally where custom 
provided the basis for law. What custom was, however, proved often difficult to ascertain.54 
Moreover, where such customs had been ‘violently interrupted’ or where ‘circumstances [had 
entirely] changed since it was established’, a group’s claim that their freedom to practise 
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longstanding customs was being obstructed required adjudication. This was done through the 
Indian Penal Code (sections 295–298), which ‘allots severe punishment to acts done with the 
intention of insulting the religion of any class of persons or wounding the religious feelings 
of any person’.55 The difficulties officials were to face in accurately determining what custom 
was in the face of competing claims of religious offence became quickly apparent.  
Soon after the riots in Bombay, local officials noticed that in different parts of the 
Presidency Muslims had begun raising money to rebuild derelict mosques and were 
petitioning officials to prevent Hindu processional music from being played in front of 
mosques during the hours of prayer. Conflicts took place across western India during the 
September and October festival seasons of 1893 and 1894. Petitions maintained that Hindus 
had taken to playing their instruments in an aggressive way, disturbing Muslims’ prayer time 
with cymbals and drums and violating longstanding custom. Hindus countered that it was a 
religious custom ‘from ancient times’ for the festival processions to be made up of people 
playing a variety of instruments.56 The district magistrates in towns where this came up 
sought to determine what the customary practice had been in each place. Conflicting accounts 
made a conclusive answer impossible, as each side claimed their customs had been interfered 
with. Ultimately, officials urged that music be stopped in front of public buildings as well as 
mosques, and this would be a policy born out of ‘courtesy and not any religious grounds’.57 
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The state’s promise of non-interference provided an avenue for the articulation of 
local grievances. Petitioners mobilised the promise of non-interference, an idiom which 
framed their engagement with the state as self-styled ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ communities. 
Indeed, ‘cow protection’ and ‘music before mosques’ became the prisms through which a 
number of local conflicts were refracted through the early twentieth century.58 It was in this 
way that a language of religious offence shaped a politics of identity in colonial India. These 
would have had a variety of local initiatives, but it was through the promise of the state to 
protect communities from hurt that these various narratives of communal difference were 
established.  
The tension between communities in different parts of India died down after 1894 as 
the initial agitation around cow protection gave way to reconciliation. Significantly for our 
story, however, the movements came to life at different points subsequently. In the Bombay 
Presidency, for instance, cow protection activists mobilised once again during the Swadeshi 
movement in 1905. The Swadeshi movement was, in the standard narrative of Indian 
nationalism, the first extra-constitutional mobilisation that articulated a broad-based anti-
colonialism. It called on Indians to boycott foreign goods and reflected a positive idea of 
patriotism.59 In December 1905, police records reported that the speaker at a swadeshi 
meeting in Maharashtra called on people to boycott imported sugar. He alleged that ‘the 
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blood of cows and bulls, and the bones of swine formed essential ingredients in all imported 
sugar which was therefore unfit … for the consumption of Hindu and Moslem alike’.60  
This cross-communal appeal to oppose colonial rule, however, saw the re-emergence 
of cow protection and its associated hostility towards Muslims. A letter to the superintendent 
in Bombay reported in January 1906 that gaurakshaks had mobilised once again:  
 
Yakub the beef butcher was here yesterday … and he says that B. G. Tilak [a young 
militant nationalist of the Indian National Congress] … is very busy again. He has got 
all the Brahmans in Wai to join together, form a fund and have collected some Rs 
20,000 to buy up cows in every bazaar round about and prevent them being sold to 
butchers. … Not a single cow has been sold to the butchers in Wai for the last six 
weeks. They began operations in Wai, now they are beginning in Poona … Yakub is 
frightened out of his life every day he goes to Wai. All the Brahmans are armed with 
big bamboos, walking about the cattle market.61 
 
Cow protection was revived as part of Swadeshi nationalism. It provided the means to 
articulate a patriotism that historians acknowledge was inflected with upper-caste idioms and 
contained anti-Muslim elements. Cow protection ‘reappeared’ after this in different regional 
contexts and at different points in time. Significantly, the activities and ideas associated with 
the movements were consistent and familiar: the claims that cow slaughter had brought about 
a decline in the milk industry, created ‘misery and suffering’ and was impoverishing India, 
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continued.62 Pictorial representations of Muslims as defiling Hindu culture were 
accompanied with intimidating behaviour. Economic arguments worked together with 
physical threats and a cultural vocabulary that spoke to a collective wrong – the violation of a 
Hindu community through the killing of the cow. In a parallel reply, Muslim communities 
sought to shore up their position, rebuilding mosques and claiming that Hindu customs 
interfered with their own. In line with Solomon’s analysis, the acts were continuous with the 
emotions they sought to create, reflecting and embodying fear, anger and hurt. By the mid-
1920s, cow slaughter and music before mosques provided the narrative anchors through 
which the articulation of individual and collective offence, framed by the promise of 
protection by the colonial state, circulated. The fact that accusations of hurt were ‘traded’ 
between Hindu and Muslim communities, to use Ahmed’s economic metaphor, and were 
given sanction by the state, enabled them to be mobilised across regions at different points in 
time.  
In 1933, in the princely state of Mangrol, a small backwater in south Gujarat, Hindu 
groups began protesting when the dewan (prime minister) passed an order that permitted cow 
slaughter. The dewan also ruled that Hindus be permitted to play music before mosques at 
any time. Mangrol had been ruled by a Muslim prince in the nineteenth century. As the story 
goes, in 1851 an animal was killed on the outskirts of the state which prompted an exodus of 
Hindus in protest. The then ruler persuaded them to return with a promise to Hindu elders 
that the ‘slaughter of any big animal within the state territory of Mangrol was forever 
prohibited’.63 Cow slaughter continued, but it was done quietly and officials, as well as local 
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Hindus, turned a blind eye. The prohibition went unchallenged until 1926, when the ruler 
passed an order that granted permission to butcher cows prompting protest from the Hindu 
Mahajan, a group of prominent men in Mangrol, that it was ‘provocative’ and ‘intolerable’ to 
Hindus.64  
A meeting of young Jains in Bombay at the Pushtimarga Youth Conference in July 
1933 noted that ‘the recent orders of the Mangrol Darbar [court] about cow-killing … have 
highly injured the religious feeling of the Vaishnavite Hindus’.65 They demanded that the 
current ruler revert to the promise of 1851 to prohibit cow slaughter. An article in the Times 
of India opined that this was an unreasonable demand. Times had changed, it observed, and it 
was no longer possible simply to rule against the interests of an entire community: ‘this world 
today is thinking in terms of broadminded tolerance of the rights of each other’. An approach 
that denied these rights and liberties, ‘to satisfy its own intolerance’, had ‘no place in their 
scheme of modern social and economic life’.66 Yet, just as the order allowing cow slaughter 
prompted the Jains to plead that this hurt their religious feelings, so too did Muslims protest 
the order. A public meeting organised by the Mangrol Young Muslim Association in July 
1933 thanked the Darbar of Mangrol for ‘restoring to the Mussalmans … their religious Right 
of Cow Slaughter’. But they objected to the ruling that allowed Hindus ‘to play Music before 
Mosques without any restrictions’. The Young Muslims requested that the Durbar consider 
imposing ‘such restrictions that may satisfy the religious susceptibilities of the Muslim 
Public’ and devise a way for Hindus to proceed ‘without any untoward incident or 
interference in the Muslim prayers’.67 
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The office of the Darbar noted in 1926 that that there were conflicts between Hindus 
and Muslims elsewhere centring on cow slaughter and music before mosques. Muslims and 
Hindus in Mangrol, concerned at these developments, wanted to have their practices 
regularised. The dewan sought to balance the rights of the two communities: ‘a legal right of 
one community should not be snatched away for the sake of the other. Moreover, where there 
is a statutory liberty to everyone in these days to follow one’s own religious reasonable 
rights, it is not at all advisable for the state to interfere in it’.68 To prevent the problems from 
coming to Mangrol and ‘taking into account the changes which the march of time had 
brought about and given birth to a spirit of toleration’, the dewan ‘thought fit to issue the 
orders of 1927’.69 Significantly, the ruler of this small princely state, steeped in local 
tradition, sought to reflect what he believed was a ‘sign of the times’ – to retain an impartial 
distance between Hindu and Muslim communities.  
How had cow slaughter and music before mosques become points of conflict in a 
place like Mangrol, so politically and culturally removed from British India, deep in the 
throes of the anti-colonial movement? What meaning did these issues hold with local people? 
That the protests around cow slaughter and music before mosques in Mangrol took a similar 
form and used a similar language as those elsewhere would seem to imply a continuity with 
such conflicts and reflect what, by 1933, was in nationalist and official discourse termed 
‘communalism’ – the inevitable primordial difference between Hindus and Muslims. We will 
never know what the particular narratives and structures of feeling were in Mangrol into 
which the cow–music conflict fit. What is striking, however, is how far the language of non-
interference and religious offence had travelled: the dewan used the language of tolerance to 
show himself as a ruler moving with the times; equally, residents of Mangrol were adept in 
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appealing to the promise to protect their feelings. Rather than reflecting immutable religious 
identity, however, the propensity to offence and the assertion of hurt – and the appeal to the 
state to rectify that hurt – can be seen as a political act. Conflict around cow protection 
occurred regularly through the decades after independence and it remained a subject of public 
concern, particularly around state legislation to ban cow slaughter.70 Yet the frequency and 
intensity of violence directed at communities whose livelihoods are tied to the cattle trade 
increased dramatically after Modi came to power.71 The next section considers this with 
regard to the contemporary resurgence of the ‘politics of hurt’ in India.  
 
Hurt feelings and the liberal state 
In February 2014, as part of an out-of-court settlement, Penguin India agreed to cease 
publication of Wendy Doniger’s The Hindus: An Alternative History, published in 2009, and 
pulp all the remaining copies.72 The suit had been filed by D. N. Batra, a retired school 
teacher and Hindutva activist, under section 295A of the Indian Penal Code. Section 295A 
criminalises any ‘deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any 
class of citizens of India’.73 Batra alleged that Doniger’s book argued that low castes had 
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significantly contributed to Hindu traditions, it showed tantra’s sexually explicit practices and 
described Hindu texts such as the Ramayana as fictional. In so doing, he said, Doniger had 
‘hurt the religious feelings of millions of Hindus’.74 Penguin India’s decision to settle the suit 
came after protesters threatened their employees and attacked its offices. Liberal audiences 
responded largely with dismay that the publisher had buckled under right-wing pressure.75 
However, a roundtable session on the controversy at the American Association of Religion 
asked us to think about this differently. The focus on censorship, they argued, missed the 
longer life of colonial law. C. S. Adcock argued that section 295A gave ‘strategic value to 
invoking or mobilizing wounded feelings’: it both incites the display of hurt feelings and 
‘actively shapes them’.76 Moreover, a law that was introduced to manage the violence that 
religious offence was seen to provoke facilitated that very violence.77 
How do we explain the contemporary currency of a colonial promise to protect 
religious feelings from offence? What allows for the expressions of hurt and their meaning to 
be apparently unchanging in different contexts? The philosopher Wendy Brown argues that 
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the liberal promise of tolerance is central to shaping a politics of offence. ‘Tolerance’, she 
maintains, works as a discourse of justice, citizenship and community in liberal 
democracies.78 Writing largely about North America and western Europe, Brown notes that 
in multicultural and multi-faith societies, the identification of the objects of tolerance – race, 
ethnicity, gender and so on – ‘abets in the production of identity’ as it is presumed ‘to 
produce a consciousness that requires protection’.79 India was not a liberal state under British 
rule, but ‘non-interference’ represented an assurance of equality between religious 
communities in the practice of their customs, one that continued as ‘freedom of religion’ as 
independent India made the transition to a liberal democracy. The act of recognition, Brown 
argues, naturalises identities, rendering them individual and personal, and reduces social 
conflicts to essentialised religious, ethnic or cultural difference. It depoliticises deeply 
historical and political processes. Social conflicts then become part of a moralising discourse 
around identity whose ‘politics’ comprises an individual or collective expression of hurt.80 In 
the context of colonial India, the state identified communities that required protection and, 
through the law, sought to manage what officials believed would be the inevitable conflict 
between them. ‘Tolerance’ does not cause conflict. However, in reifying identities and 
dispossessing contemporary problems of their constitutive histories, in understanding such 
conflicts as emotional rather than political, it facilitates such violence.81  
For Brown, the naturalising of identity explains the personalising of social conflict 
through emotion. Yet she does not explain how social conflict ‘travels’, how it seems to 
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‘reappear’ at different points. Sara Ahmed, in a discussion of hate among white nationalists in 
Britain and the US, suggests that the relationship between emotions and objects (people, 
symbols, ideas) is key. Emotions ‘involve a process of movement or association … across 
different levels of signification’.82 Emotions have what she calls a ‘rippling’ effect: ‘they 
move sideways … as well as forwards and backwards’.83 Emotions are not solely psychic, 
they are social and material and are ‘not contained within the contours of a subject’.84 They 
pass between subjects through signs and bodies, across space and time. The circulation of 
emotions through ‘affective economies’ involves this movement of signs: the way that large 
social bodies come to hate comprises both ‘movement and fixity; some bodies move 
precisely by sealing others as objects of hate’. Thus, hate requires a fixity of certain signs – 
and their repetition – as contexts change.85 
Let us reflect on cow protection in India. Cow protection movements began as part of 
the Hindu reform society, the Arya Samaj, in the 1880s. They comprised petitions and public 
demonstrations, the circulation of posters and open violence towards Muslim and Dalit 
populations in particular. Each element of the movements contained narratives of hurt, anger 
and loss at what they saw as the decline of Hindus in the face of foreign assault – both 
Muslim and British. However, even as the particular contexts changed through the twentieth 
century, the movements and their constitutive parts appeared to remain the same. 
Contemporary cow protection activists mobilise a rhetoric identical to those more than a 
century ago to justify often murderous violence, all with the claim that their feelings as 
Hindus have been wounded. Yet rather than reflect an unchanging religious identity, such 
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expressions of hurt do a kind of political work. Emotions transport ideas across contexts and 
over time. The contemporary political context in India is one where the ruling party 
advocates an ideology of Hindu nationalism and where its muted response to the murders of 
minorities has emboldened perpetrators to continue their campaigns. This has less to do with 
ideological cohesion around a religion than with the reification of feelings and the 
universalising of identity within a liberal political framework. The promise to protect 
communities against hurt is enshrined in and upheld by the law. It is, in part, the abstraction 
of the law that allows ‘religious offence’ to transmute into different contexts. The 
gaurakshak’s appeal to a primordial hurt, through familiar cultural tropes and the legal 
sanction of the state, shaped a politics of Hindu identity through the twentieth century and 
continues to do so today.  
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